# Lecture 22: Machine Learning for Wireless Systems

Scribe Notes

## 1 Introduction

This lecture discussed the challenges and considerations in deploying machine learning (ML) based wireless systems, with a focus on adversarial attacks and their unique aspects in the wireless domain.

## 2 Deploying ML-based Wireless Systems

ML typically follows a general deployment framework: selecting suitable ML algorithms, evaluating model accuracy, and monitoring error rates. However, deploying ML models in wireless systems entails specific challenges, especially regarding:

#### 2.1 Interpretability

Interpretable models are crucial in network settings, where operators need to understand the reasoning behind certain predictions. It's important to be able to explain why the performance is a certain way. Achieving interpretability is particularly challenging with complex models like deep neural networks.

#### 2.2 Latency and Compute Resources

Real-time applications demand low-latency responses from ML models, which is a limitation when resources are constrained. Wireless systems often have limited compute power at the edge, impacting deployment feasibility.

#### 2.3 Performance Stability, Generalization and Robustness

Wireless environments are highly dynamic, with factors like environmental changes impacting model stability. For instance, new structures causing distribution shifts may degrade ML performance. Robustness is essential to ensure models perform reliably in various scenarios, as shown by RAFA's studies on multi-path effects and distribution shifts. For example, consider what happens when an ML algorithm trained on a certain antenna configuration encounters new buildings, resulting in more multipath effects and distribution shifts.

### 3 Adversarial Attacks in ML

#### 3.1 Overview




Figure 1: Adversarial attack on image classification

Adversarial attacks involve creating carefully crafted noise to mislead ML models. A classic example is the "panda" image classification problem, where adding imperceptible noise to an image of a panda causes the model to misclassify it as a dog.

Mathematically, this can be represented as:

 $X \text{ (image)} + \text{ small noise } (n) \rightarrow \text{ misclassification}$ 

#### 3.2 Why Adversarial Attacks Happen

Neural networks operate in high-dimensional spaces with complex decision boundaries. Adversarial attacks exploit these boundaries by finding noise that changes classification based on one or more dimensions in this huge space.

#### 3.3 Finding Adversarial Noise

Adversarial noise is carefully crafted by iteratively updating the noise term n to maximize model error through gradient ascent, either in a white-box setting (with access to model parameters) or a black-box setting. Black-box attacks, as discussed are more challenging due to limited access to the model.

The process of finding adversarial noise typically involves:

1. Start with a guess for noise n 2. Add n to input X and feed to the model 3. Compute loss 4. If loss is high, n is effective; otherwise, perform gradient ascent to update n

#### 3.4 Types of Attacks

Adversarial attacks can be categorized as:

- White Box: Attacker has full knowledge of the model
- Black Box: Attacker has limited or no knowledge of the model (more difficult)

## 4 Wireless domain-specific challenges in Adversarial Attacks

Unlike vision, wireless environments do not allow precise control over inputs and noise due to unknown channel states and environmental factors. Adversarial attacks in the wireless domain face unique challenges compared to vision:

1. Input Uncertainty and Signal Inaccessibility: In vision, attackers know X and can directly add noise. Wireless signals are inherently private, limiting the attacker's ability to access or modify the input signal. For example, a base station's received signal differs significantly from an adversarially modified signal due to transmission distortions.

2. Environmental Effects: Attackers cannot add precise noise due to environmental and real-world shifts.

3. Robust Protections: The wireless medium offers inherent protections against random noise.

## 5 Solutions for Wireless-Specific Adversarial Attacks

To counter wireless-specific challenges, RAFA introduces:

## 6 Solutions for Wireless Adversarial Attacks

#### 6.1 Universal Adversarial Perturbations (UAP)

To address input uncertainty, attackers can use UAPs:

- Find noise n that works for all possible X (ideal)
- Focus on finding n that works for realistic/probable values of X

#### 6.2 Leveraging Reciprocity

To add precise noise, attackers can use the property of reciprocity in wireless signals to estimate the channel h(a).

#### 6.3 Modeling Real-World Effects

Timing and frequency offsets, carrier frequency offset (CFO), and packet detection delay can be mathematically modeled. However, some parameters like CFO are unknown. The solution is to use Robust UAP Design.

## 7 RAFA: A Practical Implementation

The paper introduces RAFA (RAdio Frequency Attack), a hardware-implemented adversarial attack platform for ML-based wireless systems. RAFA addresses the challenges of:

- Unknown inputs
- Lack of synchronization
- Channel-induced transformations

RAFA demonstrates effective attacks against state-of-the-art ML-based communication (FIRE) and localization (DLoc) systems.

## 8 Potential Defense Strategies

Traditional ML pipeline:

- 1. Collect dataset
- 2. Train model
- 3. Deploy
- 4. Find problems
- 5. Retrain models

Proposed defensive pipeline:

- 1. Collect dataset
- 2. Use RAFA to find problems and add to dataset
- 3. Train model
- 4. Deploy in real world

This approach allows for identifying and addressing vulnerabilities before real-world deployment, potentially leading to more robust ML-based wireless systems.

## Conclusion

ML for wireless systems shows immense potential, but vulnerabilities to adversarial attacks pose serious risks. RAFA demonstrates the feasibility of practical attacks and emphasizes the need for robust, interpretive, and generalizable models before deployment in critical wireless systems.